Assume that the problem P0 is not solvable in polynomial time. Let T be a first-order theory containing a sufficiently rich part of true arithmetic. We characterize T ∪{ConT } as the minimal extension of T proving for some algorithm that it decides P0 as fast as any algorithm B with the property that T proves that B decides P0. Here, ConT claims the consistency of T . As a byproduct, we obtain a version of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. Moreover, we characterize problems with an optimal algorithm in terms of arithmetical theories.
. Introduction
By Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem a consistent, computably enumerable and sufficiently strong first-order theory T cannot prove its own consistency Con T . In other words, T ∪ {Con T } is a proper extension of T .
In Bounded Arithmetic one studies the complexity of proofs in terms of the computational complexity of the concepts involved in the proofs (see e.g. [1, Introduction] ). Stronger theories allow reasoning with more complicated concepts. For example, a computational problem may be solvable by an algorithm whose proof of correctness needs tools not available in the given theory; moreover, stronger theories may know of faster algorithms solving the problem. When discussing these issues with the authors, Sy-David Friedman asked whether T ∪ {Con T } can be characterized in this context as a minimal extension of T . We could prove the following result (all terms will be defined in the paper). Theorem 1. Let P 0 be a decidable problem which is not decidable in polynomial time. Then there is a finite true arithmetical theory T 0 and a computable function F assigning to every computably enumerable theory T with T ⊇ T 0 an algorithm F (T ) such that (a) and (b) hold.
(a) T 0 proves that F (T ) is as fast as any algorithm T -provably deciding P 0 .
(b) For every theory T * with T * ⊇ T the following are equivalent:
(i) T * proves Con T .
(ii) The algorithm F (T ) T * -provably decides P 0 .
(iii) There is an algorithm such that T * proves that it decides P 0 and that it is as fast as any algorithm T -provably deciding P 0 .
Hence, by merely knowing the extension T of T 0 we are able to compute the algorithm F (T ), which is, provably in T 0 , as fast as any algorithm T -provably deciding P 0 ; however, in order to prove that F (T ) decides P 0 we need the full strength of T ∪ {Con T }. In this sense, T ∪ {Con T } is a minimal extension of T .
It is known [8] that there are problems P 0 such that one can effectively assign to every algorithm A deciding P 0 a further algorithm B deciding P 0 such that A is not as fast as B. Based on this fact, from our considerations yielding a proof of Theorem 1 we obtain a version of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem.
The content of the different sections is the following. In Section 3, by a standard diagonalization technique we derive a result showing for every computably enumerable set D of algorithms the existence of an algorithm that on every input behaves as some algorithm in D and that is as fast as every algorithm in D (see Lemma 2) . In Theorem 7 of Section 4 we characterize problems with an optimal algorithm in terms of arithmetical theories. Section 5 contains a proof of Theorem 1. Finally, we derive the Second Incompleteness Theorem in Section 6.
Many papers in computational complexity, older and recent ones, address the question whether hard problems have optimal or almost optimal algorithms. Although Levin [5] observed that there exists an optimal algorithm that finds a satisfying assignment for every satisfiable propositional formula, it is not known whether the class of satisfiable propositional formulas or the class of tautologies have an almost optimal algorithm.
Krajíček and Pudlák [4] showed for the latter class that an almost optimal algorithm exists if and only if "there exists a finitely axiomatized fragment T of the true arithmetic such that, for every finitely axiomatized consistent theory S, there exists a deterministic Turing machine M and a polynomial p such that for any given n, in time ≤ p(n) the machine M constructs a proof in T of Con S (n)." Here Con S (n) claims that no contradiction can be derived from S by proofs of lengths at most n.
Hartmanis [2] and Hutter [3] considered 'provable' algorithms, where 'provable' refers to a computably enumerable, more or less specified true theory T . Hartmanis compares the class of problems decidable within a given time bound with the class of problems T -provably decidable within this time bound and he studies time hierarchy theorems in this context. Hutter constructs an algorithm "which is the fastest and the shortest" deciding a given problem. As Hutter says, van Emde Boas pointed out to him that it is not provable that his algorithm decides the given problem and that his proof is a "meta-proof which cannot be formalized within the considered proof system" and he adds that "a formal proof of its correctness would prove the consistency of the proof system, which is impossible by Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem."
Unlike these papers we do not assume in Theorem 1 that T is a true theory.
. Some preliminaries
First we fix some notations and introduce some basic concepts. We consider problems as subsets of Σ * , the set of strings over the alphabet Σ := {0, 1}. For an algorithm A and a string x ∈ Σ * we let t A (x) denote the running time of A on x. In case A does not halt on x, we set t A (x) := ∞. If t A (x) is finite, we denote by A(x) the output of A on x.
If A and B are algorithms, then A is as fast as B if there is a polynomial p such that for every
Note that here we do not require that A and B decide the same P ⊆ Σ * . An algorithm deciding a problem P is optimal if it is as fast as every other algorithm deciding P , that is, if it has no superpolynomial speedup on an infinite subset of Σ
* . An algorithm A deciding P is almost optimal if (1) holds for every other algorithm B deciding P and every x ∈ P (hence nothing is required of the relationship between t A (x) and t B (x) for x / ∈ P ). We do not distinguish algorithms from their codes by strings and we do not distinguish strings from their codes by natural numbers. However, we do not fix a computation model (Turing machines, random access machines,. . . ) for algorithms. We state the results in such a way that they hold for every standard computation model.
. Diagonalizing over algorithms
In computability theory diagonalization techniques are used in various contexts. We will make use of the following result.
Lemma 2 (Diagonalization Lemma). Let D be a computably enumerable and nonempty set of algorithms. Then there is an algorithm A such that (a) and (b) hold.
(a) The algorithm A halts precisely on those inputs on which at least one algorithm in D halts, and in that case it outputs the same as some algorithm in D; more formally, for all
Moreover, there is a computable function that maps any algorithm E enumerating the set D of algorithms to an algorithm A satisfying (a) and (b).
In particular, if all algorithms in D decide P ⊆ Σ * , then A is an algorithm deciding P as fast as every D ∈ D.
Proof: Let the algorithm E enumerate the set D of algorithms, that is, E, once having been started, eventually prints out exactly the algorithms in D. For each i ∈ N we denote by E i the last algorithm printed out by E in i steps; in particular, E i is undefined if E hasn't printed any algorithm in at most i steps.
Algorithm A is defined as follows.
if the simulation halts then halt and output accordingly
5.
← + 1 6. goto 2.
In line 3, if E i is defined, then the algorithm A, after carrying out the simulation of the ( − i)th step of E i on x, stores the actual configuration of E i . Of course (the code of) A can be computed from (the code of) E. It is easy to see that A satisfies (a). Furthermore, there are constants c 0 , d 0 ∈ N such that for all x ∈ Σ * and every ∈ N, lines 2-4 take time at most
To verify (b), let D ∈ D and i D be the minimum i ∈ N with E i = D. Fix an input x ∈ Σ * . For
the simulation in line 3 halts if it didn't halt before. Therefore
for an appropriate constant c D ∈ N only depending on D.
The preceding proof uses the idea underlying standard proofs of a result due to Levin [5] . Even more, Levin's result is also a consequence of Lemma 2:
Example 3 (Levin [5] ). Let F : Σ * → Σ * be computable. An inverter of F is an algorithm I that given y in the image of F halts with some output I(y) such that F (I(y)) = y. On inputs not in the image of F , the algorithm I may do whatever it wants.
Let F be an algorithm computing F . For an arbitrary algorithm B define B * as follows. On input y the algorithm B * simulates B on y; if the simulation halts, then by simulating F it computes F (B(y)); if F (B(y)) = y, then it outputs B(y), otherwise it does not stop. Thus if B * halts on y ∈ Σ * , then it outputs a preimage of y and
Furthermore, if B is an inverter of F , then so is B * . Let D := {B * | B is an algorithm}. Denote by I opt an algorithm having for this D the properties of the algorithm A in Lemma 2. By the previous remarks it is easy to see that I opt is an inverter of F . Moreover, by Lemma 2 (b) and (3), we see that for any other inverter B of F there exists a constant c B such that for all y in the image of F
In this sense I opt is an optimal inverter of F .
. Algorithms and arithmetical theories
To talk about algorithms and strings we use arithmetical formulas, that is, first-order formulas in the language L PA := {+, · , 0, 1, <} of Peano Arithmetic. Arithmetical sentences are true (false) if they hold (do not hold) in the standard L PA -model. For a natural number n let n denote the natural L PA -term without variables denoting n (in the standard model).
Recall that an arithmetical formula is ∆ 0 if all quantifiers are bounded and it is Σ 1 if it has the form ∃x 1 . . . ∃x m ψ where ψ is ∆ 0 .
We shall use a ∆ 0 -formula Run(u, x, y, z) that defines (in the standard model) the set of tuples (u, x, y, z) such that u is an algorithm that on input x outputs y by the (code of a complete finite) run z; recall that we do not distinguish algorithms from their codes by strings and strings from their codes by natural numbers.
For the rest of this paper we fix a decidable P 0 ⊆ Σ * and an algorithm A 0 deciding P 0 .
The formula
Let L all with L PA ⊂ L all be a language containing countably many function and relation symbols of every arity ≥ 1 and countably many constants. A theory is a set T of first-order L all -sentences. We write T ϕ if the theory T proves the sentence ϕ. (b) T is sound for P 0 -decision means that for every algorithm A if T Dec P0 (A), then A decides P 0 .
(c) T is complete for P 0 -decision means that for every algorithm A if A decides P 0 , then T Dec P0 (A).
For a computably enumerable sound theory T that proves Dec P0 (A 0 ) the set
is a computably enumerable and nonempty set of algorithms deciding P 0 . Thus, by Lemma 2 for D = D(T ) we get an algorithm A deciding P 0 as fast as every algorithm in D(T ). If in addition T is complete for P 0 -decision, then D(T ) would be the set of all algorithms deciding P 0 and thus A would be an optimal algorithm for P 0 . So, the problem P 0 would have an optimal algorithm if we can find a computably enumerable theory that is both sound and complete for P 0 -decision. Unfortunately, there is no such theory as shown by the following proposition. We relax these properties in Definition 6 and show in Theorem 7 that the new ones are appropriate to characterize problems with optimal algorithms.
Proposition 5. There is no computably enumerable theory that is sound and complete for P 0 -decision.
Proof: We assume that there is a computably enumerable theory T that is sound and complete for P 0 -decision and derive a contradiction by showing that then the halting problem for Turing machines would be decidable.
For every Turing machine M we consider two algorithms. On every input x ∈ Σ * the first algorithm B 1 (M) first checks whether x codes a run of M accepting the empty input tape and then it simulates A 0 on x (recall A 0 is the fixed algorithm deciding P 0 ). If x codes an accepting run, then B 1 (M) reverses the answer A 0 (x) of A 0 on x, otherwise it outputs exactly A 0 (x). Clearly B 1 (M) decides P 0 if and only if M does not halt on the empty input tape.
The second algorithm B 2 (M), on every input x ∈ Σ * first checks exhaustively whether M halts on the empty input tape; if eventually it finds an accepting run, then it simulates A 0 on x and outputs accordingly. It is easy to verify that B 2 (M) decides P 0 if and only if M halts on the empty input tape.
As T is sound for P 0 -decision, it proves at most one of Dec P0 (B 1 (M)) and Dec P0 (B 2 (M)), and as it is complete for P 0 -decision it proves at least one of these sentences. Hence, given M, by enumerating the T -provable sentences we can decide whether M halts on the empty input tape.
Definition 6. A theory T is almost complete for P 0 -decision if for every algorithm A deciding P 0 there is an algorithm T -provably deciding P 0 that is as fast as A.
Theorem 7.
The following are equivalent for decidable P 0 ⊆ Σ * :
(i) P 0 has an optimal algorithm; (ii) There is a computably enumerable and arithmetical theory T that is sound and almost complete for P 0 -decision.
Proof: (i) ⇒ (ii): We set T := {Dec P0 (A)} where A is an optimal algorithm for P 0 . Then T is a computably enumerable true arithmetical theory. Truth implies soundness and almost completeness follows from the optimality of A.
(ii) ⇒ (i): Let T be as in (ii). Then the set D(T ) defined by (4) is nonempty by almost completeness of T and, by soundness, it is a computably enumerable set of algorithms deciding P 0 . By Lemma 2 for D = D(T ) we get an algorithm A deciding P 0 as fast as every algorithm in D(T ) and hence by almost completeness as fast as any algorithm deciding P 0 . Thus, A is an optimal algorithm for P 0 .
A result related to the implication (ii) ⇒ (i) is shown by Sadowski in [7] . He shows assuming that there does not exist an almost optimal algorithm for the set Taut of all propositional tautologies, that for every theory T there exists a subset of Taut in PTIME which is not T -provably in PTIME (cf. [7, Definition 7.5]).
. Proof of Theorem 1
Recall that P 0 ⊆ Σ * and that A 0 is an algorithm deciding P 0 . A theory T is Σ 1 -complete if every true arithmetical Σ 1 -sentence is provable in T . The following result is a consequence of Lemma 2.
Lemma 8. Assume that P 0 is not decidable in polynomial time. Let T be a computably enumerable Σ 1 -complete theory with T Dec P0 (A 0 ). Then there is an algorithm A such that: (a) The algorithm A is total (i.e., t A (x) < ∞ for all x ∈ Σ * ) and as fast as every algorithm T -provably deciding P 0 ; (b) T is consistent if and only if A decides P 0 .
Moreover, there is a computable function diag that maps any algorithm E enumerating some Σ 1 -complete theory T with T Dec P0 (A 0 ) to an algorithm A with (a) and (b).
Proof: For an algorithm B let B A 0 be the algorithm that on input x ∈ Σ * runs B and A 0 on x in parallel and returns the first answer obtained. Then
Claim 1. If T is consistent and T Dec P0 (B), then B A 0 decides P 0 .
Proof of Claim 1 : By contradiction, assume that T is consistent and T Dec P0 (B) but B A 0 does not decide P . Then B A 0 and A 0 differ on some input x ∈ Σ * . Thus t B (x) ≤ t A0 (x) and in particular B halts on x. Therefore, the following Σ 1 -sentence ϕ is true:
By Σ 1 -completeness, T ϕ. However, ϕ logically implies ¬Dec P0 (B) and thus T is inconsistent, a contradiction. If T is inconsistent, let B bad be an algorithm that accepts every input in the first step. Then B bad A 0 ∈ D 1 (T ) by inconsistency of T . Thus, by Lemma 2 (b), the algorithm A runs in polynomial time and thus does not decide P 0 .
As from an algorithm enumerating T we effectively get an algorithm enumerating D 1 (T ), by Lemma 2 it should be clear that a computable function diag as claimed exists.
Remark 9. As the preceding proof shows we only need the assumption that P 0 is not decidable in polynomial time in the proof of the implication from right to left in (b).
Proof of Theorem 1:
Recall that Robinson introduced a finite, Σ 1 -complete, and true arithmetical theory Q. Let P 0 be a decidable problem which is not decidable in polynomial time. Among others, the finite true arithmetical theory T 0 claimed to exist in Theorem 1 will extend Q and contain a formalization of Lemma 8.
We choose a Σ 1 -formula Prov(x, y) defining (in the standard model) the set of pairs (m, n) such that algorithm m enumerates a theory 2 that proves the sentence with Gödel number n. We let
Con(x) := ¬Prov x, ¬0 = 0 (here ϕ denotes the Gödel number of ϕ). If E enumerates a theory T , we write Con T for Con(E).
3
Let f : N → N be the function given by
Both, this function f and the function diag from Lemma 8 are computable and hence, Σ 1 -definable in Q. For the sake of completeness we recall what this means, say, for f : There is an arithmetical
For better readability we write arithmetical formulas using f and diag as function symbols. Further, let the arithmetical formula As-fast-as(x, y) define the pairs (n, m) such that algorithm n is as fast as algorithm m and let Ptime(x) define the set of polynomial time algorithms. Finally, we set
Afap(x, y) := ∀z Prov(x, f (z)) → As-fast-as(y, z) .
Then for an algorithm E enumerating a theory T the statement "the algorithm F (T ) is as fast as any algorithm T -provably deciding P 0 ," that is, the statement (a) in Theorem 1 is formalized by the sentence Afap E, F (T ) .
Let e-Rob(x) be a Σ 1 -formula expressing that the algorithm x enumerates a theory extending Q ∪ {Dec P0 (A 0 )}. We now define the theory T 0 . It extends Q ∪ {Dec P0 (A 0 )} by the following sentences (s1)-(s5):
(every inconsistent theory proves every sentence; here Sent(y) is a ∆ 0 -formula defining the first-order L all -sentences) (s5) ∀x∀y (As-fast-as(x, y) ∧ Ptime(y)) → Ptime(x) (if algorithm x is as fast as the polynomial algorithm y, then it is polynomial too).
Let T be a computably enumerable extension of T 0 and let E be an algorithm enumerating T . We claim that for the algorithm F (T ) := diag(E) (see Lemma 8) the statements (a) and (b) of Theorem 1 hold. The arithmetical sentence F (T ) = diag(E) is Σ 1 and true, so T 0 proves it by Σ 1 -completeness (as T 0 ⊇ Q). By the same reason, T 0 e-Rob(E). As T 0 contains (s1), T 0 Afap(E, F (T )); that is, T 0 proves that F (T ) is as fast as any algorithm T -provably deciding P 0 . Thus (a) in Theorem 1 holds.
We turn to (b). Let T * be a theory with T * ⊇ T .
(i) ⇒ (ii): So, we assume that T * Con T . We already know that T 0 , and hence T * , proves e-Rob(E). As T * contains (s2), for x = E we see that T * Dec P0 (diag(E)) and thus T * Dec P0 (F (T )); that is, F (T ) T * -provably decides P 0 .
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Immediate by part (a) of the theorem.
(iii) ⇒ (i): Let A be an algorithm such that T * Dec P0 (A) and T *
Afap (E, A) ; the latter means that T * ∀z(Prov(E, f (z)) → As-fast-as(A, z)).
Let B be an algorithm such that T * Ptime(B).
Then T * proves the following implications:
(by (s4) and as Sent(f (B)) is Σ 1 )
¬Con T → As-fast-as(A, B) (by (7)) (8) and (s5))
As T * Dec P0 (A), we see that T * Con T .
. Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem
Let P exp be the following problem:
P exp Instance: An algorithm A. Problem: Is it true that A does not accept A in at most 2 |A| steps?
Theorem 10 ( [8] ). There is a polynomial time computable function g that maps any algorithm A deciding P exp to an algorithm g(A) deciding P exp such that A is not as fast as g(A).
Proof: We fix a polynomial time computable function which assigns to every algorithm A and n ≥ 1 an algorithm A n where A n is "the same as A but padded with n useless instructions." The properties of A n we need are |A n | ≥ n, t An = t A , and A n and A accept the same language.
Note that any algorithm A deciding P exp does not reject A. Hence, for such an A we have A ∈ P exp and t A (A) > 2 |A| . Moreover, by (9), we have
(the strict inequality holding as A n decides P exp , too). The function g computes for any algorithm A the following algorithm B := g(A): On input x the algorithm B first checks whether x ∈ {A 1 , A 2 , . . .} (this can be done in time polynomial in |x|); if so, B immediately accepts, otherwise it simulates A on x and answers accordingly. Clearly, if A decides P exp , then B decides P exp and superpolynomially speeds up A on {A 1 , A 2 , . . .} by (10).
Using this result and results of preceding sections we derive the following version of Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem:
Theorem 11. There is a finite true arithmetical theory T 1 such that for every computably enumerable theory T ⊇ T 1 , if T is consistent, then T does not prove Con T .
Proof: We take as P 0 the problem P exp of the preceding theorem and let g be the function defined there. We know that P 0 is not decidable in polynomial time. Furthermore, as in the previous sections, we fix an algorithm A 0 deciding P 0 . Let T 0 be the true arithmetical, finite, and Σ 1 -complete theory defined in the previous section satisfying Theorem 1.
Being computable, g is Σ 1 -definable; for simplicity of notation we use g like a function symbol in arithmetical formulas. This is to be understood as explained in the previous proof. The theory T 1 is obtained from T 0 by adding the sentence
Let T ⊇ T 1 be a theory enumerated by the algorithm E. Assume that T is consistent. Then, by Lemma 8 (b), diag(E) decides P 0 and thus, by Theorem 10, diag(E) is not as fast as g(diag(E)).
Observe that T e-Rob(E) being a true Σ 1 -sentence. By contradiction, suppose that T Con T , that is, T Con(E). Then, T Dec P0 (diag(E)) by (s2) and hence, T Dec P0 (g(diag(E)) by (s6). Setting B := g(diag(E)) the sentence B = g(diag(E)) is a true Σ 1 -sentence; so T proves it. Then, T Dec P0 (B). This means that B = g(diag(E)) T -provably decides P 0 . By Lemma 8 (a), diag(E) is as fast as g(diag(E)) contradicting (11).
Let T 1 be the theory just defined. We show that for every true and computably enumerable arithmetical theory T ⊇ T 1 , the extension T ∪ {Con T } knows of strictly faster algorithms deciding P exp than T :
Corollary 12. Let T 1 be the theory defined in the previous proof. Then for every true and computably enumerable arithmetical theory T ⊇ T 1 there is an algorithm A such that: (a) The algorithm A T ∪ {Con T }-provably decides P exp and is as fast as every algorithm that T -provably decides P exp ;
(b) No algorithm that T -provably decides P exp is as fast as A.
Proof: Let T be as stated. By Theorem 1 for P 0 := P exp and T * := T ∪ {Con T }, we get that the algorithm A := F (T ) T ∪ {Con T }-provably decides P 0 . Furthermore, A is as fast as any algorithm that T -provably decides P 0 .
This shows (a). For (b) let B be an arbitrary algorithm that T -provably decides P 0 . Then, by (s6), the algorithm g(B) T -provably decides P 0 .
As T is a true arithmetical theory, the algorithms B (and g(B)) decide P 0 . Hence, by Theorem 10, B is not as fast as g(B).
From (12)- (14) we conclude that B is not as fast as A.
One can get rid of the assumption that T must be a true arithmetical theory in the previous result by adding to T 1 a further true arithmetical sentence:
Corollary 13. There is a finite true arithmetical theory T 2 such that for every consistent, computably enumerable theory T ⊇ T 2 there is an algorithm A such that: (a) The algorithm A T ∪ {Con T }-provably decides P exp and is as fast as every algorithm that T -provably decides P exp ;
Proof: Again, we take as P 0 the problem P exp and let A 0 be an algorithm deciding it. Let h be the function that maps an algorithm B to B A 0 (as in the proof of Lemma 8 the algorithm B A 0 on input x ∈ Σ * runs B and A 0 in parallel and returns the first answer obtained). The theory T 2 is obtained from T 1 by adding the true arithmetical sentence (s7) ∀x(Dec P0 (x) → Dec P0 (h(x))).
Let T be as stated and again let A := F (T ). As in the previous proof, we see that statement (a) holds true.
For (b), let B be an algorithm with T Dec P0 (B). Using first (s7) and then (s6) we get the algorithm g(h(B)) T -provably decides P 0 .
By (a), therefore it suffices to show that B is not as fast as g(h(B)). As by definition of h, the algorithm h(B) is as fast as B (see (5)), it already suffices to show that h(B) is not as fast as g(h(B)). By Claim 1 in the proof of Lemma 8, we know that h(B) decides P 0 . Then Theorem 10 indeed proves that h(B) is not as fast as g(h(B)).
